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RECENT DECISIONS

BANKRUPTCY - CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW - MORTGAGES. - The
plaintiff bank obtained a judgment of foreclosure and sale two days
subsequent to the passage of the Frazier-Lemke Act of 1934, whereupon the defendant farmer filed his petition for relief thereunder.
By the provisions of §75(s) of the Bankruptcy Act, a farmer who
had failed to obtain the requisite consents to a composition in bankruptcy was given alternative rights in respect to mortgaged property
upon being adjudicated a bankrupt: (1) if the mortgagee assented,
the bankrupt was given the right to purchase the land at its appraised
value, or (2) if the mortgagee refused consent, the farmer could
require the bankruptcy court to stay all proceedings for five years,
and place the bankrupt in possession, subject only to the payment of
a reasonable annual rental, with the option of obtaining clear title
upon the payment of the appraised value. Held, the Frazier-Lemke
Act of 1934 violates the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, Sr., 295 U. S. 555,
55 Sup. Ct. 854 (1935).
The Frazier-Lemke Act of 1934 was the initial attempt to
alleviate agricultural land mortgage conditions through the federal
bankruptcy power.' Through this medium Congress may discharge
a debtor's personal obligations because, unlike the states, it is not
prohibited from impairing contractual obligations. 2 However, the
bankruptcy power, like the war power, 3 the power to tax,4 the power
to regulate commerce,5 and the power to exclude aliens,6 is subject
to the Fifth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment commands that, however great the
nation's need, private property shall not be taken, even for the public
benefit, without just compensation. 7 The mortgagee's right to retain
his security in the property is the essence of the mortgage.8 To
strip him of this right, 9 to prevent realization of his security by
1

Act of 1800, c. 19, §§34, 35, 2 STAT. 19, 30, 31; Act of 1841, c. 9, §3,
443; Act of 1867, c. 176, §14, 14 STAT. 517, 522.
'Mitchell v. Clark,
110 U. S. 633, 643, 4 Sup. Ct. 170 (1884).
'Ex parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 2, 119 (1866); Ochoa v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 155, 40 Sup. Ct. 1033 (1919).
'United States v. Railroad Co., 84 U. S. 322 (1872); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1885) ; Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267
U. S. 442, 450, 45 Sup. Ct. 348 (1924) ; Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 542,
5

STAT. 440,

47 Sup. Ct. 710 (1927); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 326, 52 Sup. Ct.
358 (1932).
'Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 336. 13
Sup. Ct. 622 (1893) ; United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505, 571,
19 Sup. Ct. 25 (1898); United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 471, 23 Sup.
Ct. 349 (1903); Carrol v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 199 U. S. 401, 410, 26
Sup. Ct. 66 (1905); United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 326, 37 Sup. Ct.
380 (1916).
6 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228. 236, 237, 238, 16 Sup. Ct.
977 (1896).
2 COOLEY. CONSTITUTIONAL Li-MTATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 743.
1 JONEs, MORTGAGES (7th ed. 1915) §8.
SKy. CODE CIv. PRACT. §§375, 376; Insurance Co. of North America v.
Cheatham, 221 Ky. 668, 299 S. W. 545 (1927).
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public sale, 10 and to withhold the right to control the property during
default," violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Heretofore, the bankruptcy power has been utilized primarily
to relieve the debtor of the discouraging weight of business misfortune,' 2 not to provide him with capital with which to engage in
business in the future. The Frazier-Lemke Act is not designed
merely to discharge contractual obligations but its avowed purpose
is to take the mortgagee's rights in specific property and transfer
them to the mortgagor. 13
Measures adopted for the relief of necessitous mortgagors,
including moratorium legislation, have been held constitutional when
they have resulted primarily in a stay.1 4 This has been upon the
theory that no substantive right of the mortgagee has been impaired
since payment of the debt with interest has been deemed full compensation. 15 The Act in question cannot be supported as emergency
legislation, for the fixed period of five years in which it is to operate
6
may outlast the emergency conditions which called it into being.'
The Court refused to pass upon whether the bankruptcy clause
confers upon Congress generally the power to abridge the rights of
mortgagees in specific property. It merely asserted7 that to apply it
retroactively would violate the Fifth Amendment.1
In the closing days of the 74th Congress, §75(s) of the Bankruptcy Act was redrawn in an effort to conform to the adverse
decision of the Supreme Court. The new section became law on
August 28, 1935 and provided: (1) that upon an adjudication in
bankruptcy all proceedings be stayed for a period of three years,
unless in the discretion of the court the emergency shall cease to exist
in that locality; (2) that possession of the property remain in the
bankrupt, subject to the control of the court and to the existing
mortgages, on the payment into court of a semi-annual rental, based
'oId. KENTUCKY CODE §374.
U Brasfield & Son v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 233 Ky. 94,

25 S. W. (2d) 72 (1930) ; Watt's Adm'r v. Smith, 250 Ky. 617, 63 S. W. (2d)
796 (1933).
'Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, 244, 54 Sup. Ct. 695 (1934).
"See SEN. REP. No. 1215, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 3580 (1934) 3;

H. R.

REP.

No. 1898, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 9865 (1934) 4, incorporating

a memorandum of Representative Lemke.
" For a list of moratorium legislation enacted in the various states see

Commerce Clearing House, Bank Law Federal Service, "L" Unit, 128 C. C.
H. pp. 7802, 7809; A. H. Feller, Moratory Legislation (1933) 46 HARv. L.

REV. 1061, 1081.
'Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct.
231 (1933); W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U. S. 426, 54 Sup. Ct. 816
(1934); W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 55 Sup. Ct. 555
(1935).
"Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct.
231 (1933).
"However, to apply the act to future mortgages would destroy the
farmer's future mortgage credit as was pointed out by Senator Bankhead
in 78 CoNG. REc. 12,074 (1934).
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on community market value; and (3) that the debtor may obtain
clear title to the property by payment of the appraised value, including the amount of the incumbrances, subject to the demand
of the
18
secured creditor that the property be sold at public sale.
J. E. H.

BROKER-LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTY TO AGENT-COMMISSIONS.

-Plaintiffs, real estate brokers, were employed by the owner of
certain premises to effect the sale of the premises. Plaintiffs
approached the defendants to induce them to purchase the property.
Several proposals were made by the plaintiffs and rejected by the
defendants. In the course of one of the conferences, one of the
plaintiffs suggested: "I have got an idea where I can show you how
you can buy the property without any cash at a price of $145,000.
Would you be interested ?" The owner consented to the terms offered
by the plaintiffs and orally accepted by the defendants, but the latter
changed their minds and the plaintiffs sue, alleging an employment
of them by defendants, a breach by defendants of that contract of
employment and demand as damages a sum measured by the amount
of the commissions which defendants were alleged to have prevented
plaintiffs from receiving from the owner. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision for the defendants on the ground that the
evidence failed to prove a contract of employment of plaintiffs by
defendants. Grossnn et al. v. Herman et al., 266 N. Y. 249, 194
N. E. 694 (1935).
The mere fact that brokers have been employed by an owner to
procure a sale or lease of real estate need not in itself necessarily
prevent such brokers, under proper circumstances, from accepting
employment also from a purchaser or a lessee.' But in order to
recover commissions from the latter, the broker has the burden of
proving a contract of employment between them.2 Such a contract
has been inferred although the broker was already under contract
with the owner. 3 In the instant case the facts did not constitute an
employment between the brokers and the prospective purchasers. The
latter's acceptance of the proposition made by the brokers who were
then acting for the owner would not justify the inference of an
"In re Slaughter, U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. Texas, Oct. 12, 1935, reported
in Commerce Clearing House, Bankruptcy Law Service, p. 3621 (holding the
new section constitutional). Contra: It re Young. N. Y. Times, Oct. 22,

1935, at 1, reporting a decision of the U. S. Dist. Ct., Ill. In re Sherman Bkpt.,
N. Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1935, at 6, reporting a decision of U. S. Dist. Ct., Va.

'Knauss v. Gottfried Krueger Brewing Co., 142 N. Y. 70, 36 N. E. 867
(1894).
'Parker v. Simon, 231 N. Y. 503, 132 N. E. 404 (1921).
'Pease & Elliman, Inc. v. Gladwin Realty Co., 216 App. Div. 421, 215 N.
Y. Supp. 346 (1st Dept. 1926).

